





Towards Integrating Husserlian Phenomenology 
with Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness
Abstract
The paper presents, first, some general remarks about Husserl’s philosophical Phenome-
nology in view of relating it to the scientific study of consciousness, and recalls some of the 
basic methodological tenets of a Husserlian phenomenology of consciousness (I). It then 
introduces some recent work on so-called “mental imagery” in cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience (II). Next, a detailed exposition of a reflective analysis of conscious experi-
ences that involve “imagery” or “images” is given (III), arguing thereby that reflective 
conceptual clarifications of various forms of such experiences could contribute to research 
into their finer details. In order to show more distinctly that the conscious experiences 
involved in the contemporary cognitive and neuroscientific imagery research are indeed 
differently structured, a simple notation for designating the various structural components 
of the experiences under study will be used. In concluding (IV), some methodological assets 
concerning the present proposal of integrating the method of Husserlian phenomenology 





























the	mind	and	consciousness	which,	based	on	 such	 introspection,	 find	 their	



























serl’s	 philosophical	 phenomenology,	 in	 view	 of	 relating	 it	 to	 the	 scientific	
study	of	consciousness,	and	recalling	some	of	the	basic	methodological	tenets	
of	a	Husserlian	phenomenology	of	consciousness	 (I),	 I	will	have	a	 look	at	


























consciousness,	 in	my	understanding,	makes	 the	phenomenological	 findings	































rein als es selbst]”,	namely	just	as	it	can	be	given	in	pure	reflection.
For	present	purposes,	it	is	crucial	to	be	alert	from	the	outset	to	the	following	







regard	 to	what	essentially	–	or	as	he	 liked	 to	say,	eidetically –	makes	up	a	
conscious	experience	of	one	kind	or	another	taken	purely	in	it	itself,	there	is	
no	difference,	 and	 there	can	be	none,	between	 the	empirical	psychological	



















to	 refer	 to	 experiences	 of	 one	 kind	 or	 another,	 accounting	 thereby	 for	 the	
different	kinds	of	experience	not	just	in	terms	of	phenomenal	or	qualitative	





























I	take	this	emphasis	on	the	conditions of the possibility of	conscious	experi-
ences	very	seriously.	The	matter	may	also	be	put	thusly:	“eidetic	data”,	i.e.	
data	concerned	with	“what it is”,	i.e.	according	to	its	essential	possibility,	to	
experience	 something	one	way	or	 another,	 are	 crucial,	 especially	 so	 in	 the	
present	context	in	which	I	would	like	to	make	it	look	like	a	plausible,	even	
a	desirable	enterprise,	to	work	towards	the	integration	of	phenomenological 
findings	 with	 all	 the	 other	 evidence	 that	 neuroscientific	 and	 psychological	
studies	about	the	phenomena	of	consciousness	are	able	to	accumulate.






modifications	 of	 such	 experiences,	 rather	 than	 with	 these	 experiences	 and	
their	intentional	objects	as actual matters of fact.	A	concern	with	empirical	
matters	of	fact	is	proper	to	the	sciences,	and	justly	so.	Logically	prior	to	this	




a	 given	 conscious	 experience	 of	 something	 provides	 the	 experiential	 basis	
for	 the	sought-after	description	of	 its	 invariant	 structure	or	 form	according	
to	its	very	possibility	(that	is,	in	Husserlian	terms,	according	to	its	eidos	or	






implicit,	 and	 it	 is	 just	 the	 task	 of	 phenomenological	 reflection	 and	 eidetic	
analysis	 systematically	 to	 explicate	 distinct	 phenomenological	 concepts	 of	
the	various	kinds	of	consciousness.	Based	on	one’s	everyday	familiarity	with	
a	conscious	experience	of	a	certain	kind	as	designated	in	ordinary	language,	a	

















































“objective”	 rather	 than	“subjective”	and	 thus	no	 longer	 first-person	data	at	
all,	since	they	are	not	being	taken	as	factually	mine.	Now	while	it	is	true	that	
phenomenology	is	concerned	with	consciousness	in general	and	not	with,	say,	





















Now,	 when	 I	 want	 to	 determine	 the	 essential	 possibility	 of	 what	 it	 is	 like	
to	 be	 consciously	 experiencing	 something	 in	one	way	or	 another	 –	 say,	 to	
imagine	something	or	to	remember	something,	etc.	–	I	will	reflect	first	of	all	
on	experiences	 that	are	mine,	or	 that	could	be	mine	 if	 I	were	 to	 re-present	

















































lar ways	during	both	functions,	 the	two	differ	 in	key	ways:	 imagery,	unlike	perception,	does	
not	require	low-level	organizational	processing,	whereas	perception,	unlike	imagery,	does	not	
require	us	 to	 activate	 information	 in	memory	when	 the	 stimulus	 is	not	present”	 (2001:	636;	
emphasis	mine).












pp.	 246:	 “Die	 ‘Unfehlbarkeit’	 der	 Wesens-
anschauung”.
4













As	 I	 understand	 all	 this,	 I	 suppose	 that,	 taken in isolation,	 the	 findings	 of	
overlapping	specific	cortical	areas	in	perception	and	imagery	do	indeed	cor-
roborate	 the	view	of	an	 inner	connection	between	perception	and	forms	of	











appear	 to	be	 involved	 in	such	neuroscientific	 investigations	consist	 in,	and	
how	they	may	be	lawfully	related	to	one	another,	let	us	return	to	Husserlian	
phenomenology.	 I	will	be	paying	special	attention	 to	 the	phenomena of in-
tentional implication or modification of	experiences	within	the	unified	re-pre-
sentational	experiences	of	imagining	and	picturing,	and	combinations	thereof.	
As	I	understand	the	neuroscientific	research	in	question,	one	of	the	most	vi-




stimuli.5 In	my	view,	phenomenological	 clarifications	of	 conscious	 experi-
ences,	 in	 so	 far	as	 they	aim	at	making	explicit	 lawful internal connections 



























































i		 	 	 	 	 	 	(REP	–	[PER])	–		 x	 	│	├		⁄	–	x
	 (PRE)	s		 	 	 	 		 			(PER)		 	 	 	y
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(4a)		 	 	 	 	 i		 	 	 	 	 	 			(REP	–	[REP	…	])├		⁄	–	x





(4b)	i		 	 	 	 	 	 	(REP	–	[REP	–	[PER]])	–		 x	 	│├		⁄	–	x








(4c)	i		 	 	 	 	 	 	(REP	–	[         REP	–	[PER]])	–		 x	 	│├		⁄	–	x





























iving	is	only	re-presented	and	no longer	experienced as actually occurring.	In	















































person	data	 should	be	 systematically	 integrated	with	 third-person	neurosci-




































To	 conclude,	 let	 me	 highlight	 some	 methodological	 assets	 concerning	 the	
















ments	 (Gallagher,	2003),	 it	 is	crucial	 that	 the	verbal	 reports	be	 reflectively	
gathered	descriptive	reports	about	eidetic	structures	of	consciousness.	Such	
reports	or	descriptions	are	to	be	elaborated	prior to	an	experiment.	Ideally,	
a	methodologically	 sophisticated	phenomenologist	 should	be	 included	 in	 a	
research	 team,	 providing,	 in	 advance	 of	 an	 experiment,	 the	 relevant	 struc-
tural	first-person	data	concerning	possible	conscious	experiences.	Research-
ers	could	 then	 take	 the	phenomenologist’s	descriptive	report	of	 this	or	 that	
kind	of	conscious	experience	as	a	heuristic	guide	for	designing	experiments	
that	uncover	the	finer	details	of	an	experience,	of	which,	based	on	a	suitable	
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Eduard Marbach
Zu einer Integrierung der Husserl’schen Phänomenologie mit 
der kognitiven Neurowissenwissenschaft des Bewusstseins
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Beitrag beginnt mit einigen allgemeinen Anmerkungen zur Husserl’schen philosophischen 
Phänomenologie mit Blick auf ihre Verknüpfung mit der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des 
Bewusstseins, wobei auf einige methodologische Grundsätze der Husserl’schen Phänomeno-
logie des Bewusstseins zurückgegriffen wird (I). Sodann verweist der Autor auf einige jüngere 
Arbeiten über das sog. „geistige (bildhafte) Vorstellungsvermögen“ in der Kognitiven Psycho-
logie und der Neurowissenschaft (II). Es folgt eine detaillierte reflektive Analyse von Bewusst-
seinserfahrungen, die auf geistigem Vorstellungsvermögen oder geistigen Bildern beruhen (III), 
wobei die These vertreten wird, dass reflektive konzeptuelle Klarstellungen solcher Formen der 
Erfahrung zu deren vertiefter Erforschung beitragen können. Um genauer zeigen zu können, 
dass Bewusstseinserfahrungen, die den Gegenstand zeitgenössischer kognitiver und neurowis-
senschaftlicher Forschungen über das Vorstellungsvermögen darstellen, in der Tat eine andere 
Struktur aufweisen, verwendet der Autor einfache Formeln zur Darstellung der verschiedenen 
Strukturkomponenten der untersuchten Erfahrungen. In seiner Schlussbemerkung (IV) unter-
streicht er bestimmte methodologische Vorzüge, die den neuerdings vorgebrachten Vorschlag 
betreffen, die Methode der Husserl’schen Phänomenologie einzubinden in die zeitgenösssiche 





Vers l’intégration de la phénoménologie husserlienne 
dans les neurosciences cognitives de la conscience
Résumé
L’article présente d’abord quelques remarques d’ordre général sur la phénoménologie philo-
sophique de Husserl afin de les relier à l’étude scientifique de la conscience et de rappeler quel-
ques-unes des doctrines méthodologiques de la phénoménologie husserlienne de la conscience 
(I). Le texte expose ensuite quelques travaux récents relevant de l’approche dite de l’« imagerie 
cérébrale » dans les domaines de la psychologie et des neurosciences cognitives (II). Ensuite, un 
exposé détaillé d’une analyse réflexive des expériences conscientes, impliquant l’«imagerie » 
ou des « images » (III), affirme que les clarifications conceptuelles et réflexives des différentes 
formes de ces expériences pourraient contribuer à les explorer plus en détail. Afin de démontrer 
plus précisément que les expériences conscientes, impliquées dans la recherche de l’imagerie 
cognitive et neuroscientifique contemporaine, sont effectivement structurées différemment, une 
simple notation sera utilisée pour décrire les différentes composantes structurelles des expérien-
ces en cours d’étude. La conclusion (IV) souligne certains points méthodologiques concernant 
la proposition actuelle d’intégrer la méthode de la phénoménologie husserlienne dans l’étude 
contemporaine, en espérant qu’elle le sera encore davantage dans des études futures.
Mots-clés
conscience,	méthodologie	husserlienne,	neurosciences	cognitives,	données	à	 la	première	personne,	
données	à	la	troisième	personne,	imagerie	mentale
